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ABSTRACT: 
 
There a few absolutes in political science, but the historical observation that 
democracy does not just evolve without any form of struggle or demand for it, and 
the theoretical assumption that countries do not simply embark on the path of 
transition to democracy without a crisis of legitimacy for the old regime, are 
closest to being universally accepted. However, this paper will demonstrate how 
historic precedence can prove theory wrong by analyzing Bhutan’s transition to 
democracy. Assembling the basic assumptions of the most popular approaches to 
regime transitions, it will be shown that none of them can fully or even partly 
account for democratization in Bhutan. It will be shown that a paramount 
centrality of agency rather than structure was the driving force behind a 
transition to democracy that can very well be characterized as being unique. At 
least for the case of Bhutan, the long ongoing structure-agency-debate has been 
clearly decided in favor of the latter. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The history of democracy is a history of struggle. From its early beginnings in 
the late 18th century up to the present day, it has not simply emerged by virtue or 
chance. India did not simply gain her freedom ‘at the stroke of the midnight hour’ in 
1947, nor did the Berlin Wall suddenly crumble into nothing on that memorable 
night in 1989. In almost every nation the people or parts of the citizenry demanded,                                                         
1 This paper is based on research conducted for the author’s MA thesis entitled ‘Democracy 
in Bhutan: A Challenge for Contemporary Theory?’ I would like to express my gratitude to 
the anonymous reviewers and to Prof. Subrata K. Mitra for their valuable comments and 
support. 
2 Marian Gallenkamp is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science at Heidelberg 
University’s South Asia Institute and a research fellow at the South Asia Democratic Forum, 
Brussels. He holds a MA in Political Science and Politics South Asia and has specialized in 
studies of democratization, democracy theory and measurement as well as the politics of 
Bhutan. He is also the author of www.bhutan-research.org, an internet knowledge base for 
the study of politics and democracy in Bhutan. He can be reached at gallenkamp@bhutan-
research.org 
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bargained, and fought for freedom and democracy. The desire for participation and 
representation, the determination to take part in the political process and to influence 
decisions, the longing for independence and freedom, the urge to throw off the 
shackles of tyranny and oppression, all were driving motives that mobilized the 
masses and eventually became forces which so many acien régimes all over the 
world could no longer resist. In some places change came slowly, at an almost 
evolutionary pace, in others it came abruptly and at times even violently. However, 
regardless of the many potential ways that lead to democracy in both political theory 
and historic reality, one common denominator is and has always been that some 
form of struggle was involved. Democracy does not simply appear, someone has to 
demand it in order to initiate change. Democracy is not a universal or uncontested 
concept, it is not the be-all-and-end-all way by which power is distributed and 
authority is organized in a given society. Those in power usually like to hold on to it 
and do not simply or willingly stage a coup against themselves, hence disagreement 
and struggle evolves, not only regarding democracy itself but also about the shape it 
should take.  
 
And yet, looking at the Kingdom of Bhutan, this long history of struggle for 
political change, for democracy, appears so strangely remote. So often romantically 
referred to as the Land of the Thundering Dragon, Land of Happiness, the Last 
Shangri-La, Bhutan is country, which, until very recently, has been one of the last 
absolute monarchies in an age that has not only seen an unprecedented proliferation 
of democracy, but also a frightening ingenuity of how to rule by authoritarian and 
even totalitarian means. The character of Bhutanese politics has in large parts been 
distinct from what scholars expect it to be and know. Various authors, including 
myself, have attested to this fact, but this difference from what we observe elsewhere 
has been taken to a whole new dimension by the events that unfolded in Bhutan 
between 1998 and 2008. Bhutan’s transition to democracy has been peaceful, calm, 
and unflinching. It has been initiated, guided, and executed solely by the king. Given 
the regional neighborhood’s experience with democratization this appears even more 
astonishing. Its transition and the resulting democracy are probably unique and 
Senator John McCain is right to “encourage our friends and colleagues to get to 
know Bhutan better because I think it can serve as an example to many other parts of 
the world that have either tried and failed or are struggling towards freely electing 
democratic governments”3.  
 
In order to demonstrate the unique way in which democracy was achieved in 
Bhutan, the first part of this paper will undertake to reassemble the main approaches 
by which transitions have been explained in the past. In order to do so I will draw on 
a number of selected authors whose works I deem exemplary for the main 
explanatory concepts that account for transitions to democracy. In the second part, 
these explanations and concepts are put to the test by analyzing them within the 
context of Bhutan’s transition to democracy. Finally, conclusions will be drawn that 
stress the overall centrality of agency in the Bhutanese process of democratization. 
In fact it will be made clear that the leadership of one single person resulted in the 
triumph of agency over structure. This is not to mean that structure does not play a 
role at all, but agency can shape structure and render the latter’s inhibiting factors for 
democratization irrelevant. 
 
 
                                                         
3 Malcolm, Andrew (2008), 'John McCain visits Bhutan, gives tips on democracy', Los 
Angeles Times, 05 December 2008. Available at 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2008/12/mccain-bhutan.html.(as of 31.05.2012) 
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BASIC TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
Before starting to look into the different approaches that try to explain transitions, it 
is important to clarify and define some of the terms that will be used throughout the 
following pages: 
 
First, the object of investigation will be referred to as political regime, or 
political system. The latter relates to the “interrelationship of executives, legislatures 
and judiciaries within a constitutional framework” while regime is used to “describe 
a wider perspective, taking in methods of decision-making and values underlying the 
citizen-state relationship” (Bealey, F. and A. G. Johnson 1999: 259). In studies of 
democratization however, these terms are usually used interchangeable in the form 
of ‘regime change’ or ‘system change’4.  
 
Second, the term ‘transition’ needs proper attention. To start with, ‘transition’ 
has to be differentiated from ‘consolidation’. The former refers to the period of 
change in which one type of regime gets replaced by another; the latter refers to the 
phase after the new regime is in place. As Rustow in his seminal article observed, 
“the factors that keep democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it into 
existence” (Rustow, D. A. 1970: 346). While the reasons and explanations for a 
transition may be the same or similar to the ones accounting for the stability of the 
new system, they do not necessarily have to. Also, the term ‘transition’ for itself 
does not indicate at all which direction the change is taking. The idea that “any 
country moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition 
toward democracy” (Carothers, T. 2002: 6) has proved to be an illusion. Regime 
change does not have to result in the establishment of democracy, not only can it 
produce a different type of authoritarian regime, but change is also no one-way-road. 
Democracies can as well undergo a transition and regress into autocracies. Only 
where a transition towards democracy occurs can it be referred to as 
‘democratization’. Lastly, transitions to democracy are by no means a homogenous 
straight-running process. They may differ considerably in time, in their 
preconditions, and in the intensity of conflict involved. 
 
Third, there exists no common agreement over the exact endpoint of a 
transition to democracy. For some scholars the transition period ends with the 
holding of founding elections, for others it ends when the first change of government 
takes place. For the purpose of this paper I will consider the excellent definition 
given by Linz and Stepan as relevant: 
 
A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about 
the political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes 
to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de 
facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative 
and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with 
other bodies de jure. (Linz, J. J. and A. C. Stepan 1996: 1)                                                           
4 For the sake of completeness it should be mentioned that there exists another approach that 
distinguishes with great detail between the terms of ‘system’ and ‘regime’, where ‘political 
system’ is actually the broader conceptualized term of the two. Furthermore with regard to 
the term ‘transition’ this approach differentiates between ‘regime change’, ‘regime 
exchange’, ‘system change’, ‘system exchange’, transition and transformation. However, this 
nomenclature has so far not found its way into mainstream transitology. For further details 
refer to Merkel, Wolfgang (2010), Systemtransformation - Eine Einführung in die Theorie 
und Empirie der Transformationsforschung (2nd revised edn.; Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften), 62-66.  
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The great advantage of this definition is that although it refers to the end of 
democratic transitions, it already implies at least some limited degree of stability 
with regard to the democracy that evolved and that still has to consolidate. Without 
some form of consensus about the cardinal ‘rules of the game’ a transition can hardly 
be seen as finished, because transitions to democracy are not merely about the 
introduction of new sets of institutions and rules, but also about the resolution of 
conflicts and the accommodation of different interests.    
 
 
EXPLAINING REGIME CHANGE: SYSTEM, MODERNIZATION, CLASS, 
CULTURE, RELIGION, AND AGENCY 
 
Evolutionary Universals — Talcott Parsons 
 
To begin with, the most rudimentary approach to explain why regime change takes 
place is to draw on system theory as it was developed by Talcott Parsons. 
Accordingly, the fate of nations is prescribed as eventually leading into modernity. 
They do so by functional differentiation of the system. For this, societies need to 
develop certain evolutionary universals that enable the system to adapt to a more 
complex and changing environment. If it fails to do so, it can no longer generate the 
required output and thus loses legitimacy. For Parsons the “the democratic 
association with elective leadership and fully enfranchised membership” (Parsons, T. 
1964: 353) is one of these universals. Democracy is best suited to fulfil the functions 
of the political system, to organize society and advance it further, because “the larger 
and more complex a society becomes, the more important is effective political 
organization, not only in its administrative capacity, but also, and not least, in its 
support of a universalistic legal order” (Ibid. 355), the universalistic legal order 
being another universal in itself. Therefore it follows that systems without the 
universal of democracy are not only less capable of adapting to the environment and 
providing societal development, they are also not as efficient. For this reason they 
sooner or later fail to generate the required output and lose legitimacy. The system 
comes off balance and will change. Although this is a rather crude description of the 
Parsonian approach, and its deterministic view can by no means account for many 
transitions, Parsons made a remarkable true prediction in 1964: with regard to the 
Soviet Union he predicted “that it will prove to be unstable and will either make 
adjustments in the general direction of electoral democracy and a plural party system 
or "regress" into generally less advanced and politically less effective forms of 
organization, failing to advance as rapidly or as far as otherwise may be expected” 
(Ibid. 356). However, the universalistic claim of system theory should be rejected 
and the level of analysis is far too general to account for the actual process of 
transition. But it has to be recognized that the approach’s notion of legitimacy and 
efficiency of the political system are of value to the debate. 
 
Social Requisites — Seymour Martin Lipset 
 
While the macro-systemic level of analysis of Talcott Parsons gives only vague ideas 
about the causes for democratic transitions, another set of approaches building on his 
systemic perspective gets a lot more specific. Modernization theory focuses 
primarily on the economic system or rather on socio-economic development as a key 
variable in explaining change of the political system. It has attracted wide attention 
especially during the 1950s and 60s and has in recent years resurfaced in the debate 
with regard to the large number of countries in which democracy could not take 
hold. Its foundations can be traced to the seminal article of Seymour Martin Lipset in 
1959. Based on a minimalistic procedural definition of democracy he seeks to 
explain why democracy was able to take hold in some countries while not in others. 
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For this purpose he does not even try to delineate democracies from non-
democracies properly, but simply categorizes countries to be ‘more’ or ‘less’ 
democratic along comparably crude criteria (Cf. Lipset, S. M. 1959: 71-74). He then 
identifies key socio-economic variables that differ between the two types of regimes. 
These are split into four categories: wealth, industrialization, education, and 
urbanisation, all of which are interrelated and together they constitute modernization 
in Lipset’s conception. Variables include amongst others: GDP per capita, males 
working in agriculture, energy consumption, literacy rate, enrolment in educational 
facilities, and per cent of people living in differently sized urban areas (Cf. Ibid. 
76f.).  From the results of his empirical analysis he concludes “that democracy is 
related to the state of economic development. Concretely, this means that the more 
well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (Ibid. 75). 
The causal chain behind this argument goes as follows: economic development 
caused by e.g. industrialization leads to an increase in education, which in turn 
changes the political culture towards more tolerant and moderate attitudes, 
behaviour, and norms. These are translated by political elites into a more restrained 
attitude of the government with regard to oppositions. Adding to this is a change in 
the class- and social structure of a society, caused again by economic development. 
The lower classes experience an income raise and are no longer existentially 
threatened, which reduces political radicalism; a broad middle class is evolving that 
has better access to more education, thus demanding more participation in the 
political process; and the upper classes in turn are less likely to disregard a growing 
middle class and to disrespect a more literate and well-to-do lower class, thus being 
more willing to share power (Cf.Merkel, W. 2010: 72). As a by-product of greater 
education and raised living-standards, people in a society are more likely to from and 
participate in “intermediary organizations and institutions which can act as sources 
of countervailing power, and recruiters of participants in the political process” 
(Lipset, S. M. 1959: 84). Long before the concept of social capital gained 
prominence with the writings of Putnam (Cf. Putnam, R. D. 1993: 175), Lipset was 
already drawing from Tocqueville (Cf. Tocqueville, A. d. 2004: 253) and realizing 
the importance of a well-functioning civil society. Although other scholars in the 
tradition of Lipset might have used different variables, thereby altering the causal 
chain to some extent, the main argument has not only stayed the same, but it has also 
been attributed some form of universal applicability.  
 
While economic development directly relates to the efficiency of a political 
system, it is not the sole factor for its stability. Lipset identifies two more aspects, 
which, though “correlated with economic development” (Lipset, S. M. 1959: 86), are 
distinct from the factors he listed so far. Legitimacy and effectiveness are major 
contributors to (and a lack of them causes for) system (in)stability. Though 
efficiency and effectiveness are both seen as contributing factors to legitimacy, he 
also distinguishes between a more general, latent support and acceptance for the 
political system and a more output orientated one (Cf. Ibid. 86-100). 
 
In modernization theory a political system becomes unstable, if it lacks 
sufficient legitimacy (e.g. due to excessive use of force), if it is not effective (e.g. 
corruption, nepotism), or if it lacks efficiency (i.e. economic performance). This 
generally applies to democracies and non-democracies equally. However, non-
democracies are faced with a special dilemma: if they cannot provide for economic 
development the whole system loses legitimacy and becomes unstable. If they 
succeed in providing economic development the consequences described above 
come into effect. That in turn puts the political system under great pressure to give in 
to the new demands of the population. Either way, the system is bound to become 
unstable and to disintegrate. 
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Although Lipset revaluates some of his assumptions later on (Cf. Lipset, S. M. 
1994), putting greater emphasize on cultural variables (as done by e.g. Huntington), 
political culture (e.g. Almond and Verba), and adding a traditional dimension as 
being conducive to legitimacy (Cf. Ibid. 8-10), he is probably still one of the most 
misperceived scholars in democratization studies. Many studies of transition that rely 
on modernization theory took Lipset’s ‘social requisites’ as their ‘prerequisites’ for 
successful transitions. Lipset however states that this “conclusion does not justify the 
optimistic liberal's hope that an increase in wealth, in the size of the middle class, in 
education, and other related factors will necessarily mean the spread of democracy or 
the stabilizing of democracy” (Lipset, S. M. 1959: 103). Though he strongly 
believed in his causal chain, he admitted that these factors are only likely to 
influence the development and stability of democracy, they do not determine it. 
Also, he is not that dismissive of historic factors that can influence regime change or 
explain why certain regimes that have not developed his social requisites became 
democracies and others that did so remained autocracies5. Finally, Lipset was much 
more aware of the influence of agency than most of those who followed him, and 
especially in his 1994 article he stresses the necessity to combine the structural 
requisites with the dimension of agency6.  
 
In recent years the focus has shifted somewhat towards other structural factors 
to explain transitions to democracy. However, since research began properly 
differentiating between transition and consolidation, modernization theory still plays 
a prominent role in the latter. In this regard the works of Adam Przeworski and his 
colleagues were pioneering. Claiming a relationship between development and 
democracy, they assumed that “either democracies may be more likely to emerge as 
countries develop economically, or they may be established independently of 
economic development but may be more likely to survive in developed countries” 
(Przeworski, A. and F. Limongi 1997: 155f.). The results of their empirical analysis 
are by now commonly accepted and repeatedly tested by other scholars. They 
conclude that the “emergence of democracy is not a by-product of economic 
development. Democracy is or is not established by political actors pursuing their 
goals, and it can be initiated at any level of development. Only once it is established 
do economic constraints play a role: the chances for the survival of democracy are 
greater when the country is richer” (Ibid. 177).   
 
Class and Power — Barrington Moore, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 
 
Another set of structural approaches that try to explain democratization focuses on 
the changes in the social structure and power relations within the society. These 
approaches are usually of a qualitative nature and thus depart from the quantitative 
empirical method of modernization theory. They apply a long-term perspective and 
use comparative historical analysis to develop models of path-dependency that lead 
to certain regime outcomes. 
 
For Barrington Moore the decisive factor for the development of democracy is 
the strength of an urbanized middle class. Towards the end of Social Origins he 
plainly states: “No Bourgeois, No Democracy” (Moore, B. 1966: 4218). Though the                                                         
5 “A political form may develop because of a syndrome of fairly unique historical factors, 
even though major social characteristics favor another form.” Lipset, Seymour Martin (1959), 
'Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy', 
The American Political Science Review, 53 (1), 72. Also cf. Lipset, Seymour Martin (1994), 
'The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited', American Sociological Review, 59 (1), 16. 
6 “Whether democracy succeeds or fails continues to depend significantly on the choices, 
behaviors, and decisions of political leaders and groups.” Lipset (1994), 18. 
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development of a bourgeois middle class can be tied in parts to the arguments of 
modernization theory, Moore’s arguments are not so much concerned with the path 
of economic development. Instead, based on the strength of the bourgeois class and 
its coalitions with either the ‘peasants’7 or the ‘landed aristocracy’, fundamental 
dynamics evolve that lead to different regime outcomes, i.e. liberal democracy, 
fascism, and communism (Cf. Skocpol, T. 1973: 6-8 and 12f.). The importance of 
the bourgeois class can be found in the fact that it is “a group in society with an 
independent economic base, which attacks obstacles to a democratic version of 
capitalism” (Moore, B. 1966: xxi).  Though the actual coalition between the 
bourgeois class and either the landed upper class or the peasants may vary from case 
to case, it is imperative that the bourgeois impulse is strong enough to eliminate or 
overthrow the opposing sections of the society. Where this impulse was weaker, it 
sided with parts of the old elite, which did in fact lead to capitalist market 
organization, but not to democracy. According to Moore these cases developed a 
fascist system. Finally, Communism evolved in countries where the bourgeois 
impulse was weak or non-existent and where the form of commercial agriculture was 
labour repressive. In any of the three cases Moore stresses the fact that regimes did 
not simply evolve, but where the products of violent struggle. In the case of 
democracy a bourgeois revolution took place; fascism was brought about by a 
(bourgeois) revolution from above, and communism by a peasant revolution. 
 
Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens on the other hand apply a broader 
perspective than Moore’s Marxist approach. They rely almost exclusively on the 
different power relations within society and the international environment. For them 
“it is power relations that importantly determine whether democracy can emerge, 
stabilize, and then maintain itself even in the face of adverse conditions” 
(Rueschemeyer, D. et al. 1992: 5). These power relations are clustered into three 
different types. First, the balance of class power within society, which is regarded 
the most important determinant. Second, the structure and capacity of the state and 
the resulting state-society relations determine the balance of power between state and 
society, but also within society. Third, transnational structures of power can not only 
shape and influence state structure and capacity, but also affect the balance of power 
within society (Cf. Rueschemeyer, D. et al. 1997: 325). This broader perspective 
provides for the possibility of additional structural variables (the state and the 
international environment) to influence the prospects for democratization of a 
society. 
 
Contrary to Moore who assigned a decisive role to the bourgeois middle class, 
Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens conclude that it is precisely this class who 
they expect to be as much opposed to democracy as the upper classes. They admit 
that the evolving middle class might be responsible for the introduction of 
parliaments, but it strongly opposed a suffrage extension to the lower classes (Cf. 
Rueschemeyer, D. et al. 1992: 8; Stephens, J. D. 1989: 1065). For them, the crucial 
push for universal suffrage, which is seen as a decisive step in democratization, 
originated from the evolving working class. This demand “promised to include the 
class in the polity where it could further pursue its interests” (Rueschemeyer, D. et 
al. 1992: 6). It was able to do so by an “unprecedented capacity for self-organization 
due to such developments as urbanization, factory production, and new forms of 
communications and transportation” (Rueschemeyer, D. et al. 1997: 325).  
 
However, though both approaches presented above claim to distance 
themselves strongly from the paradigms of modernization theory, they cannot ignore                                                         
7 With regard to importance of the peasantry Moore distinguishes between market orientated 
and labour repressive organization of the agrarian sector. 
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the decisive and overriding impact of capitalist development. They might focus on a 
different consequence of modernization, namely the change in class relations, but 
ultimately this is triggered by capitalist development, and should not be ignored once 
it gave the impetus for social change. Another problematic aspect of these 
approaches is their deterministic claim that the arguments they developed do not 
only account for the “establishment and the maintenance of formal democracy but 
are also critical in deepening formal democracy toward more fully participatory 
democracy and advancing [it] toward social and economic equality” (Ibid. 326). 
Finally, an aspect, which accounts for a weak spot on the one hand, but at the same 
time also for a more realistic view has to be mentioned. Both works are careful in 
asserting universal applicability of their claims to non-western societies. The prime 
object of their investigation is the development in Europe and, to a lesser degree, in 
Latin America. Moore already realized that a case such as India can hardly fit the 
three ways into modernity he envisages (Cf. Moore, B. 1966: xxii and 314ff.). This 
is a point worth mentioning considering the fact that most transitions in the second 
half of the 20th and the beginning of 21st century were by no means characterized by 
the long evolutionary processes that are presented by Moore and Rueschemeyer et 
al.. More importantly, the momentum of capitalist development that triggered the 
changes they claim has long subsided. To be sure, capitalist development, 
modernization in general, and more recently globalization still shape and change 
societies all over the world, but the defining moment of beginning capitalism and the 
creative power it had cannot be repeated today, as the configuration of virtually all 
influencing environmental factors has changed. 
 
Culture and Religion — Samuel P. Huntington 
 
In a strict sense the arguments on culture and religion developed by Samuel 
Huntington are by no means a coherent approach to the explanation of transitions to 
democracy. Instead, they just provide an additional explanatory component to the 
question why so many countries outside the west have not yet been able to develop 
or sustain democracy. In another sense his arguments can also be traced to the work 
of Max Weber on The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber’s other 
writings on the sociology of religion in non-western societies and in extension to the 
class structure based approaches in explaining western democratization presented 
above. 
 
Huntington identifies eight different civilizations to which he attributes 
different levels of conduciveness to democracy and its inherent values and norms. 
He does so in reaction to the rather restrictive formulations of George Kennan, who 
postulates that democracy is only viable in the western context, as it “evolved in […] 
northwestern  Europe […] and was then carried out into other parts of the world, 
including North America, where peoples from that northwestern European area 
appeared as original settlers, or as colonialists” (quoted in Huntington, S. P. 1993b: 
298). Hence democracy has only a “very narrow base both in time and space; and the 
evidence has yet to be produced that it is the natural form of rule for peoples outside 
those narrow perimeters” (Ibid.). 
 
The set of civilizations he comes up with include: Western, Confucian, 
Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and African (Cf. 
Huntington, S. P. 1993a: 25). He observes that the “people of different civilizations 
have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the 
group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as 
differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and 
authority, equality and hierarchy” (Ibid.). For this reasons he concludes that western, 
Latin American and, with some deductions, the Japanese culture are compatible with 
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western democracy. Slavic-Orthodox, Hindu, and African culture are seen to be very 
ambiguous with regard to democracy, while Confucian and Islamic culture are 
described as outright incompatible (Cf. Merkel, W. 2010: 80). This is based in the 
fact that especially in the last two cultures, the necessary values, rights, and liberties 
that are required for any definition of democracy, would not only be undermined but 
also seen as completely illegitimate.  
 
Interestingly enough, in his entire world roundup, Huntington completely 
ignores Buddhism and the countries that fall in its cultural realm. Only later in his 
book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order does he refer to 
Buddhism for as much as 17 lines out of the book’s 369 pages8.  For him 
“Buddhism, although a major religion, has not been the basis of a major civilization” 
(Huntington, S. P. 1997: 48). Hence, in all his indisputably valuable contributions to 
the field of democratization studies, the influence of Buddhism is ignored.  
 
The assumptions Huntington made have sparked intense discussions on the 
subject of religion and culture. Especially with regard to the prospects and actual 
shape of democracy in Asia, a whole new string of literature appeared since the mid-
1990s. Generally, Huntington’s conclusions have been rejected by most authors and 
actually proven wrong by empirical findings. Fukuyama for instance showed “that 
there is no fundamental cultural obstacle to the democratization of contemporary 
Confucian societies” (Fukuyama, F. 1995: 32). The dispute about so called ‘Asian 
style democracy’ has furthermore enriched the more basic discussion about the 
meaning of democracy9 itself. 
 
Agency and Pacts — Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter 
 
Agency-based approaches towards transitions to democracy perform a decisive shift 
in perspective compared to all structural approaches. While the latter are 
predominantly concerned with the question by what factors democratization is 
caused, facilitated, or supported, and, to a lesser extent, why some regime changes 
do not lead to democracy but to other forms of political systems, agency-based 
approaches try to open up the ‘black box’ of transition itself. They seek to 
understand more clearly what happens during the process of transition and in what 
way the choices made in this process influences its outcome. They do so by 
assigning greatest importance to individual actors or groups of actors that are 
involved in the process of transition.  
 
For O’Donnell and Schmitter transitions from authoritarian rule are initiated 
when the incumbents “begin to modify their own rules in the direction of providing 
more secure guarantees for the rights of individuals and groups” (O'Donnell, G. A. 
and P. C. Schmitter 1986: 6). The impetus for a regime to open up (the authors 
introduced the term liberalization for this process) originates from the soft-liners 
within the authoritarian elite. In itself the separation of soft-liners and hard-liners 
within the regime is an important step, as parts of the authoritarian elite only splits 
into soft-liners when they become increasingly aware “that the regime they helped to 
implant […] will have to make use […] of some degree or some form of electoral                                                         
8 Note that the word ‘Buddhism’ appears more often, but only in connection to other 
civilizations and mostly to demonstrate that it is no civilization in its own right. 
9 Cf. amongst others Hood, Steven J. (1998), 'The Myth of Asian-Style Democracy', Asian 
Survey, 38 (9); Huang, Min-Hua and Yun-Han Chu (2010), 'Solving an Asian Puzzle', 
Journal of Democracy, 21 (4); Lu, Jie and Tianjian Shi (2010), 'The Shadow of 
Confucianism', Journal of Democracy, 21 (4); Tatsuo, Inoue (1999), 'Liberal Democracy and 
Asian Orientalism', The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights. 
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legitimation” (Ibid. 16). The reasons for this realization can be manifold, but 
O’Donnell and Schmitter suggest that, besides the defeat in war and a succeeding 
occupation by a democratic country, the factors that cause the initial division of the 
authoritarian elites can be found predominantly in domestic, internal affairs (Ibid. 
18). The authors assert that “there is no transition whose beginning is not the 
consequence – direct or indirect – of important divisions within the authoritarian 
regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-
liners” (Ibid. 19). Some form of crisis or perceived crisis that undermines the 
legitimacy of the old regime has to ‘nibble’ on its foundations, before some actors 
within the regime elite become aware of the necessity of liberalization in order to 
react to growing discontent in the population. 
 
The transition itself, a period of great uncertainty (Ibid. 3), is characterized by 
a “high degree of indeterminacy embedded in situations where unexpected events 
(fortuna), insufficient information, hurried and audacious choices, confusion about 
motives and interests, plasticity, and even indefinition of political identities, as well 
as the talents of specific individuals (virtù), are frequently decisive in determining 
the outcomes” (Ibid. 5). For O’Donnell and Schmitter, the best way to limit this huge 
amount of uncertainty is for the regime soft-liners and the opposition to engage in a 
bargaining process at which end pacts can provide for more predictability and 
certainty with regard to political action. They define pact as “an explicit, but not 
always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a selected set of actors 
which seeks to define (or better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power 
on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those entering into it” 
(Ibid. 39). One important aspect of this definition of pacts is that the actors have their 
‘vital interests’ in mind when negotiating about the future shape of the political 
system. Depending on the relationship and strength of the regime elites or the 
opposition, this can provide an interesting explanation for the specific setups and 
configurations of power in newly emerging systems. The actors are seen to be 
rational, but this rationality is (or can be) restricted by structural factors influencing 
their room for manoeuvre, or their obligations to the groups they represent. In course 
of time, the initially elite driven negotiation of pacts becomes more and more shifted 
towards a mobilized civil society, which in turn requires the incorporation of further 
democratic demands (Ibid. 41 and 48ff.). Another interesting aspect of this process is 
that because both sides, regime soft-liners and regime opposition, fear a coup from 
the regime hard-liners, they both refrain from trying to enforce too radical demands 
that are perceived as threatening to push the hard-liners or other possible veto 
powers over the edge. Thereby, the results of pacts are usually of a moderate, 
tempered nature, which in turn often leads to mutually equitable mechanisms of 
resolving conflict and dissent in the resulting democratic system (Ibid. 24f.). 
 
Finally, the authors do not claim that this particular process is the only one 
that results in the establishment of democracy. They are fully aware that it can also 
be achieved by some form of revolutionary struggle, or, where the regime elites are 
completely discredited, by an overthrow of the old regime. However, where pacts are 
a feature of transition, the authors are convinced that “they are desirable – that is, 
they enhance the probability that the process will lead to a viable political 
democracy” (Ibid. 39). 
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TRANSITION IN THE KINGDOM OF BHUTAN 
 
Having extensively elaborated on some of the different approaches to explain 
transitions in general and democratization in particular, it is now time to shift the 
focus on the Kingdom of Bhutan in order to seek an answer to the question as to why 
the country democratized and what shape this process took. 
 
However, before doing so it is imperative to stress that the preceding 
presentation of different approaches towards transitions is by no means all-
encompassing. The myriad of ideas and assumptions makes it virtually impossible to 
draw a conclusive picture. As Terry Lynn Karl observed, “[w]ith the constant 
introduction of new causal variables and the multiplication of explanations, various 
scholars […] have made heroic efforts to synthesize these debates as well as the 
range of explanatory factors” (Karl, T. L. 2005: 15). One of the main reasons for this 
can be found in the fact that approaches in transitology are overwhelmingly derived 
from empirical observations and “as the variety of democratizations has multiplied, 
so has the scholarly and analytical literature proliferated” (Whitehead, L. 2002: 2). 
On the one hand this diversity makes it much harder for scholars to come up with 
consistent explanations of regime change that can be applied to all cases throughout 
space and time, on the other hand there is still a great innovative potential in the 
discipline, and although authors tend to lean towards one of the main currents of 
transition studies, they are not bound by them. The realization has trickled in that 
transitions are not monocausal processes, but that there are many factors which can 
trigger this process and shape its outcome. Over the past 15 years the larger part of 
literature on democratization has drawn from many approaches and provided a 
combination of different structural variables and actors’ choices to explain their 
respective cases10. 
 
To begin with, let us take a look at some factors that are believed to be crucial 
to structural approaches that are derived from modernization theory11. Bhutan’s GDP 
per capita in 2009 was 1,805 US $, up from 762 US $ in 200012. However, this 
drastic change probably reflects more the volatile development of general GDP due 
to hydro power construction projects then a real and substantial increase in the 
peoples’ income. Its adult literacy rate is merely 59%13, though there appears to exist 
                                                        
10 The theoretical and methodological implications of these endeavors to combine structural 
and voluntaristic approaches to regime change have been demonstrated remarkably insightful 
by James Mahoney and Richard Snyder. For further reading refer to Mahoney, James and 
Richard Snyder (1999), 'Rethinking Agency and Structure in the Study of Regime Change', 
Studies in Comparative International Development, 34 (2). 
11 Note that a great problem is posed by a lack of reliable data. Only in recent years have 
national statistics been more comprehensive. Time series data for most indicators are missing 
or date back only to the 1980s. Vital social indicators are only collected during the census 
and household surveys that take place every five years. Unless otherwise indicated, the data 
provided in this section has been taken from World Bank (2010), 'World Development 
Indicators', Available at 
http://databank.worldbank.org/databank/download/WDIandGDF_excel.zip.(as of 
31.05.2012) 
12 Royal Government of Bhtuan (2005), 'Population and Housing Census of Bhutan - 2005', 
National Statistics Bureau (Thimphu). Available at 
http://www.nsb.gov.bt/pub/phcb/PHCB2005.pdf.(as of 31.05.2012) 
13 Royal Government of Bhtuan (2010), 'Annual Education Statistics, 2010', Ministry Of 
Education (Thimphu). Available at 
http://www.education.gov.bt/Publications/AES%202010%20working%20final%20version%
20without%20indicator.pdf.(as of 31.05.2012) 
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a sharp contrast between urban and rural areas14 as well as between adults and 
children. The percentage of people living in urban areas amounts to only 35.6% of 
the total population. Out of a total workforce of 312,700 people, 204,400 people or 
65.4% are employed in the primary i.e. agricultural sector. 11.5% or 36,000 people 
are employed in the secondary sector15, and 44,200 people or 14.1% are employed in 
the tertiary sector. 28,100 people or 9.0% are civil servants or military personal. 
Regarding the different sectors’ GDP share, the primary sector accounts for 21.2%, 
the secondary for 39.1%, and the tertiary sector for 39.7% of the GDP in 200816. 
Approximately 90% of the population are covered by basic health care, while there 
are only 171 doctors in the country. 83.2% have access to safe drinking water17. Its 
per capita energy consumption amounts to 80.46 million Btu18. Though Bhutan has 
made astonishing progress in many development fields (Cf. Singh, S. 2010: 152ff.), 
it is still listed as one of the 48 least developed countries (LDCs) in the world. 
However, especially with regard to the United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), Bhutan has “made remarkable strides toward the achievement of the 
MDGs” (United Nations Development Programme 2010), and its resolve “to achieve 
[them] is indeed a valuable example for the global community. The government’s 
strategy is a model for other countries on how to successfully implement the 
Millennium Declaration through a unique development approach” (Ibid.). 
 
The rather good progress in achieving the MDGs may however not hide the 
fact that with regard to the typical factors that are attributed great importance by 
modernization theory, Bhutan, as a least developed country, is far from attaining any 
of the, as sufficient regarded, conditions conducive to the establishment of 
democracy. The one factor that to some extent meets the criteria set by 
modernization theory would be education, which has consistently been fostered. 
Though adult literacy rate is low, one should not overlook the fact that Bhutan has a 
huge population under the age of 25 (289,708 or 41.6%), and the government’s 
efforts have resulted in a net enrolment rate in primary education of over 93% of 
which almost 90% reach the seventh grade (Royal Government of Bhtuan 2010). 
However, as these data relates to 2009 and figures were lower when the actual 
transition started in 1998, the factor of education could only become important in the 
consolidation of democracy. The following figures will provide for time series data 
on GDP growth, GDP per capita, energy consumption per capita, and percentage of 
urban and rural population. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
14 In 2005 literacy rate in urban areas was reported to be 75.9 %, whereas in rural areas it was 
only 52.1 %.  
15 According to Bhutanese statistics that includes: mining and quarrying; manufacturing; 
electricity, gas and water supply; construction; household goods; private households with 
employed persons.   
16 Royal Government of Bhtuan (2009), 'Statistical Yearbook of Bhutan, 2009', National 
Statistics Bureau (Thimphu). Available at http://www.nsb.gov.bt/pub/syb/syb2009.pdf.(as of 
31.05.2012) 
17 Ibid. 
18 Us Energy Information Administration (2010), 'International Energy Statistics', Available 
at 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=44&pid=45&aid=2&cid=BT,
&syid=1980&eyid=2008&unit=QBTU.(as of 31.05.2012) 
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Figure 1: GDP growth in %, 1982–200919 
 
 
Figure 2: GDP per capita in current US $, 1982–2009 
 
 
Figure 3: Per capita energy consumption in million Btu, 1980–2008 
 
  
                                                        
19 The following figures are the author’s own design and have been compiled using data from 
the aforementioned sources. 
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Figure 4: % of rural and urban population, 1960–2009 
 
If one looks at the class structure of Bhutan, the picture regarding the conditions that 
might trigger a transition appear almost as non-existent as did the socio-economic 
factors. Not only is the majority of the population employed in agriculture, there also 
exists almost no noteworthy middle class or working class that could facilitate 
change in line with the arguments made by Moore, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and 
Stephens (Cf. Sinpeng, A. 2007: 23). Moreover, a landed aristocracy is missing as 
well as the former feudal system had been removed by the third Druk Gyalpo back in 
1956. Until very recently, the country’s population was almost entirely agrarian in 
character. Besides this, only a small, comparatively professional bureaucracy exists, 
which also provides personnel for government positions. However, none of these 
groups did oppose or demand democratic changes within the system. The last social 
group with considerable influence that could have opposed or even prevented the 
initiation of a democratic transition has been the Buddhist monastic bodies. But they 
had been politically marginalized early during the establishment of monarchy, and 
later on they were well integrated into the overall system, so that it is nowadays far 
from challenging the existing political order (Cf. Winderl, T. 2004: 10f.). 
Modernization in Bhutan took a completely different shape from that in most 
countries. Instead of massive social transformation, it appears that development 
came in the form of “change in continuity” (Mathou, T. 2000). Education has been 
widely expanded with almost all children enrolled in primary and even secondary 
facilities. Apart from tertiary education there exists almost no gender gap between 
boys and girls. Education has become universal nowadays, which reflects in high 
literacy rates of about 80% among the young people. Similar changes, albeit slower, 
are taking place in the work sphere where the percentage of women is constantly 
growing. Modern communication and information technology has entered Bhutan 
and given its extremely different terrain and sparse population density, the growing 
number of mobile and internet users is not astonishing (the number of mobile phone 
subscribers has exploded from almost 0 in 2002 to 36.5 per 100 population in 2008; 
the number of internet users per 100 population has risen from 0.1 in 1999 to 6.6 in 
2008). Taken together with the achievement of providing the population with basic 
needs (universal child immunization has been achieved several years ago; access to 
clean drinking water has risen to over 90%; proper sanitation is reaching 90% 
coverage; rural electrification has been massively expanded and will be universal by 
2012 or 2013), it appears that Bhutan could embark on a path of modernization, 
providing its population with the civilizational merits, without causing or at least 
limiting the negative consequences associated with it. There is no rural exodus but 
only a slow shift towards the urban areas. Unemployment has remained comparably 
low as well. Most strikingly, the fact that modernization has everywhere else come 
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along with, at times massive, industrialization does not hold true for Bhutan. 
Employment figures and the economy’s sectors share of the GDP show that the 
tertiary sector is growing equally strong or even stronger as the secondary. Bhutan 
appears to have skipped industrialization and is instead directly developing towards a 
service society. Though agriculture will certainly remain an important part of the 
economy in terms of employment, trends indicate that the service sector is growing 
far more promising than the industrial one. Add to this an on-going surge in 
education, which qualifies people to work in sophisticated jobs of the service sector 
and chances are high that this trend will continue in the future. 
 
Regarding cultural variables that would explain Bhutan’s transition to 
democracy it is difficult to make conclusive statements. The relationship between 
Buddhism and democracy is a subject that has been discussed only rarely. As has 
been shown earlier, the argument over certain inhibiting factors of specific religions 
and cultures can always be countered by naming values and norms that would be 
supportive of democracy (Cf. Bell, D. A. 2008). However, to my view the specific 
traits that come with Buddhism in Bhutan (Cf. for example Williams, P. 2009) are 
probably at least as conducive to democracy as western culture is thought to be. 
“Like Buddhism, modern democracy is based on the principle that all human beings 
are essentially equal, and that each of us has an equal right to life, liberty, and 
happiness. […] Thus not only are Buddhism and democracy compatible, they are 
rooted in a common understanding of the equality and potential of every individual” 
(His Holiness the Dalai Lama 1999: 3f.). But democracy is not exclusively about the 
rights of the individual. Hence, “a system whereby the interests of the individual are 
balanced with the wider well-being of the community at large” (Ibid. 4) is needed. In 
Buddhism, this dualism between individual and group rights is well embodied. 
Together with its tradition of consensual decision making, ‘Buddhist democracy’ 
appears not only possible but also viable. 
 
Finally, the question of agency in Bhutan’s transition to democracy is 
palpable. The initiative for democratization emanated solely from the fourth Dragon 
King. Neither was he compelled to liberalize the system by a growing pressure from 
the people, nor did he have to react to an existing or perceived crisis. Admittedly, 
one can hardly know for sure whether he perceived his country to be in a crisis that 
would require democratization, but all sources available suggest that this was not the 
case. Also, no external pressure was put on Bhutan to liberalize, neither from its 
direct neighbours, nor from its donors. In line with the arguments of democratic 
diffusion theory, it is also implausible that Bhutan’s direct neighbourhood had a 
decisive impact on the king’s decision. Only India as a consolidated democracy 
could have had that effect, but it usually refrained from getting involved into any 
internal matters of Bhutan and given India’s vast diversity, its ethnic, religious, and 
political conflicts, and its lack of governance in parts of the country, it surely did not 
even serve as the most viable example for democracy to Bhutan.  
 
Interestingly, the King had initiated the beginning of the transition, not by 
liberalization as it is understood by O’Donnell and Schmitter, but by strengthening 
the executive and legislative, thus devolving his own powers and strengthening state 
institutions. And as there was virtually no opposition to the monarchy, there was 
consequently no one to negotiate with about defining the new rules of the political 
system. This unique circumstance made it possible that the new ‘rules of the game’ 
could be deliberated on with care and patience and above all without politicization 
by the drafting committee. Clearly, no pact had to be established to broker the 
outcome of transition, and, with an apolitical and disengaged public, revolution, 
system overthrow, or negotiated reform were also out of the question (Cf. Karl, T. L. 
and P. C. Schmitter 1991: 275). What remains is the transition mode of imposition, 
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or transition from above. According to the literature, these cases are characterized by 
regime elites who anticipate the crisis and hope to retain some of their powers, or 
satisfy the opposition with limited concessions (Ibid. 278 and Merkel 2010: 101), if 
they allow for reforms. However, most important is the elite’s belief in their ability 
to control this process of liberalization. Generally, this belief has turned out to be a 
myth, especially once civil society gets mobilized and activated, transitions tend to 
get out of the control of the old regime’s incumbents, as long as they do not resort to 
violence and repression in a desperate effort to stop the process (Cf. Linz, J. J. and 
A. C. Stepan 1996). In Bhutan none of this happened. Even when national security 
was threatened by Indian militants who had sought refuge in the dense forests of 
southern Bhutan and a surprisingly well orchestrated military operation took place 
(Cf. for example Gallenkamp, M. 2010: 3), the King did not hold or reversed the 
process of transition. It would have been easy to cling to his powers and to restrict 
freedoms by reference to a national emergency. 
 
It appears that the whole process had been long planned and envisioned by the 
King, as he began to involve the general public in the decision-making process early 
on in 1981. The refugee crisis might have slowed down his plans, but only 
temporarily. For more than 20 years before the introduction of democracy, some 
form of consensual, participatory ‘grass-roots democracy’ had been nurtured, which 
in turn made it possible to openly discuss and deliberate about the draft constitution 
throughout the whole country (Cf. Gallenkamp, M. 2011: 16ff.). These deliberations 
were no charade to secure support. They had a direct impact on the final version of 
the constitution and the opinions and concerns of the population left a direct mark on 
the document (Penjore, U. 2007). Thus, the great uncertainty that is usually 
attributed to transitions was kept low by reconnecting the process of deliberation 
about the new system to its subjects.  
 
But what is probably most remarkable in the Bhutanese transition, is the fact 
that the King abdicated once the constitution was finalized and preparations for 
elections had already begun. At an age in which some other royals in Europe still 
wait to ascend to the throne, the King made way for his young son, an Oxford 
educated Master of Political Science. This should probably make even the harshest 
critics think twice about the king’s motives. The argument that he initiated 
democratization in order to preserve his powers after he saw what had happened in 
Nepal simply makes no sense. The path that eventually led to a full transition to 
democracy had been taken long before the Nepalese monarchy began to crumble. 
But if one suggests that motives other than his personal self-interests have guided his 
actions, one reaches the explanatory limits of much of political theory. This relates to 
two fundamental problems in the study of transitions and especially of authoritarian 
rule: Frist, all approaches to regime change regardless of their explanatory models 
assume that the initial reason for a transition is a lack of legitimacy of the old 
political system. No matter by what it is caused, without a legitimacy crisis there can 
be no regime change, because transitions are costly in their transactions and it would 
make no sense to embark on such a path, if the present regime is already able to 
satisfy the needs, aspirations, and demands of its subjects. There have to be at least 
some people within a system that are dissatisfied with the status quo and that are 
willing to change it. As stated in my introduction, there has to be someone 
demanding democracy. Second, if political science is often diverse in its approaches 
to explain certain observations, it shows a remarkable consensus when it comes to 
one single fact about authoritarian regimes: they may be more or less repressive, 
they may also grant different degrees of freedoms and liberties to their people, but 
they are essentially ‘bad’! This perception underlies much of the study of regime 
change, and, though it also carries a substantial normative dimension, history has 
given enough reasons to believe in this inherent ‘badness’. However, the fact that 
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authoritarian regimes have to be bad by nature accounts for many of the problems 
with which one is faced while working on Bhutan. The Bhutanese system, though 
certainly paternalistic of its people and at times making questionable decisions (but 
which system does not?), has been essentially ‘good’. Its rulers did, to the largest 
possible extent, rule for the good of the people and not for their own benefit. They 
did not accumulate unspeakable wealth, nor did they abuse the powers that where 
vested in them. They appear to have had the greater good in mind when ruling the 
country. In 100 years of Wangchuck rule over Bhutan, the only thing that distorts the 
overall image is the Lhotshampa conflict, which appears somewhat antithetical in 
comparison to the general conduct of politics by the monarchy and its overall 
commitment to the common good. But while this should certainly not be ignored, it 
also should not cloud once view when thinking about the country’s transition. More 
than twenty years after the eruption of that conflict, the decisions of the King and the 
Royal Government, the historic move towards democracy, and the conduct of 
democratic politics are still being judged far too often in reference to and on the 
grounds of the Lhotshampa issue.   
 
 
CONCLUSIONS: A TRIUMPH OF AGENCY OVER STRUCTURE? 
 
To conclude, one can assert that although authors like Merkel or Linz and Stepan are 
open to the idea of democratization from above, neither of them imagined a case in 
which such a process could be carried out completely peacefully. Also, the 
possibility of a guided system change that is envisioned by the ruler and then 
executed over a long period as well as pursued with an honest commitment to the 
wellbeing of the people and the nation, is one which has so far not found any 
mentioning in theory. Additionally, the intention that provoked this guided regime 
change clearly differs from usual explanations. While the initiation of a top-down 
model of system change is usually attributed to mounting pressures on the ruling 
elite, whether internal or external, the Bhutanese transition has not witnessed any 
such processes. Internally as well as externally, the King has never been confronted 
with any serious pressures and he was free to choose the time and path towards 
transition.  
 
It has also been shown that, despite respectable developments in terms of 
socio-economic indicators, the set of structural variables derived from modernization 
theory, does not provide for an explanation of Bhutan’s transition to democracy. If at 
all, one would expect them to have an inhibiting influence. But this has not been the 
case. Bhutan succeeded in its transition even though it is one of the least developed 
countries in the world. Another set of explanations, the power structure within 
society, does not yield any better results. In the absence of a credible middle class or 
working class, the respective approaches to regime change cannot explain the 
Bhutanese case either. The question of agency has also been discussed and the result 
is more than obvious. Whether the king’s choices were constrained by structural 
factors is hard to say except for culture and religion, which certainly influenced the 
King’s ideas of a ‘good society’. These two factors certainly played an important 
role, but to understand them as constrains is probably not the right way. Instead one 
can assume that the underlying principles of Buddhism played a facilitating role in 
so far, as democracy was not perceived to be threatening or not suitable for the 
country. 
 
As regime change is always being conceptualized as a reaction to or 
consequence of the deligitimation of the status quo, theories of regime change build 
on that fundamental assumption. Thus, an explanation derived from the approaches 
presented above or a combination thereof, can not sufficiently account for Bhutan’s 
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transition to democracy. The only things that can be distilled from them are factors 
that might have had a supporting or conducive effect on the prospects of transition. 
But as it has been shown, the influencing variables identified by many scholars 
would rather point in the opposite direction. Bhutan has probably been one of the 
most unlikely places to develop democracy. And yet it did. But what empowered a 
single individual to launch all these reforms despite a discouraging structural context 
and a complete lack of demand for democracy? To my view it is the paradox already 
indicated above that accounts for the smooth transition to democracy. On the one 
hand, political power has not been interpreted by the monarch as his ability to do 
whatever is good for him, but almost exclusively as a means to provide for stability, 
harmony, and peace for his country and people. The fundamental Buddhist ideas of 
compassion and responsibility, the quest for enlightenment to advance once own 
mind and existence, were paired with an astonishing capacity to rule and govern the 
real world. The ideas of the interconnectedness of Dharma and Samsara were not 
only underlying state principles, but also reflected upon the monarchs attitudes to 
engage in politics. On the other hand, and this argument might be just as compelling, 
especially to those who reject the first one as purely esoteric, the power of the 
monarch to engage in changes that actually did not directly reflect the peoples 
aspirations and for which no demand existed, stemmed from an astonishing surplus 
of legitimacy. If we assume that legitimacy for a political system is grounded in its 
subjects support (Cf. for example Easton, D. 1975), in general or output specific, for 
the system, one can argue that the general support in Bhutan did not relate to the 
institutional setup before the transition per se, but rather to the institution of 
monarchy. With the above mentioned exception, the monarchs had never discredited 
themselves and reigned with the larger responsibility for society at view. The output 
specific support for the policy decisions by the King and the Royal Government had 
been the result of a carefully planned and executed policy of ‘change in continuity’, 
that did not oppress the people, provided development without uprooting them, and 
safeguarded the norms and values which they held dear.  This remarkable legitimacy 
generating balance can be attributed to a political strategy of hybridization that 
shaped past and present policies and institutions. The fourth King was able to 
connect traditional Bhutanese values, norms and institutions with concepts and ideas 
of governance that clearly did not emanate in the country. As his authority was by no 
means contested he was able to reduce the uncertainty commonly attributed to 
periods of transition by providing an open and transparent process of reformulating 
the ‘rules of the game’. In the end, one should probably also consider that democracy 
was probably not seen as an end in itself, but rather as a means for ensuring a 
continued and safe pursuit of a common or greater good. 
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